Me-ism, and other Reasons for Economists to Think Big about Development

Why should economists continue to work on such ambitious Big Ideas in Development -- what drives Development?  Freedom? Property Rights? Human Capital? Whether you are just like ME? One good reason is that most people are going to have their own Big Ideas anyway.  If economists and other social scientists refuse to discuss Big Ideas, then people will just base them on some random anecdote or on laughably casual empirics. (I once heard a prominent non-development economist say he understood underdevelopment after his first 5 minutes in a poor country.)

One way that casual back-of-the-envelope empirics seems to work is I judge other peoples more favorably the more they are like me.   

One of the worst forms of Me-ism is racism. What could be more direct than just assume the rich people are racially superior to the poor people? Racism was the prevailing explanation in "Development Economics" for 5 centuries until racism became politically unacceptable (and was refuted scientifically). 

Racism (like other forms of Me-ism) is just lazy empirical work. You go for some superficial correlate of development that has no other evidence behind it --other than your instinct that everybody should be judged by how similar they are to you.

So thank goodness that many development economists are continuing to write about all the above topics. They may not achieve 100% airtight evidence, they may not definitively resolve what causes what, but I think they do better than the Me-ists and the racists who decide the answer in the first 5 minutes.

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Congressional Muslim Terrorism Hearings: the Mathematical Witness Transcript

UPDATE 11am response to commentator: is there an association between inability to understand Bayes' theorem with ethnic prejudice?UPDATE 3:30PM explaining risk of false positives to congressmen and commentators

Congressman Chairman: Muslims! Terrorists! Muslims! Terrorists!

Witness: Let A be the event of terrorism, and B be the event of Muslimism. Then P(A|B)≠P(B|A)

Congressman: What are you talking about?

Witness: You seem to be confusing the probability that a Muslim person will be a terrorist with the probability that a terrorist person will be a Muslim

Congressman: And you seem to be confusing everyone in this hearing, smartass.

bayes rule
bayes rule

Witness:

Congressman:  What did you just call me?

Witness: it’s simple, the probability that a Muslim will be a terrorist will be 13,000 times lower than the probability that a terrorist will be a Muslim. That is, the ratio of the probability of being a terrorist to the probability of being a Muslim is about 1 over 13,000 (P(A)/P(B)).

Congressman:  so even the math department has been taken over by politically correct academic radicals who hate America?

Witness: even if you think that the Probability of a Terrorist being a Muslim is 95.3%, the probability of a Muslim being a Terrorist is only 0.0007%. That is less than the probability of a left-handed octogenarian Olympic discus-thrower being struck by lightning.

Congressman: or maybe even less than the probability that anyone is listening to you?

Witness: maybe this picture will help.

terrorist muslims
terrorist muslims

Congressman: I’m calling your state legislature right now to fire your radical butt.

POSTCRIPT: response to commentator:

Mr. McKinney, perhaps your prejudices led you to mis-read the piece. 13,000 was how much larger one conditional probability was than another, which is helpful for understanding Bayes' Theorem but not for policy. The policy-relevant probability is that of a Muslim being a terrorist, which based on a Rand report was calculated here as 0.007 percent.

If you still don't get this, then why don't you also start targeting white males, since 80% of serial killers fit that description, and these serial killers kill about 100 people a year.

Regards, Bill Easterly

POSTCRIPT 2 3:30PM

To the Congressman and Mr. McKinney (again):

One other probability you may want to consider is that Al-Qaeda's recruiting will become more successful by a δ >= 0.0007 percent after you have persecuted the 99.9993 percent of Muslims who are innocent.

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Lies My Poets Told Me: The Prehistory of Development Economics

This post is by Adam Martin, a post-doctoral fellow at DRI. A couple months ago, Bill addressed the imperial origins of state-led development, arguing that economic development was a substitute for racism as a rationalization of empire. I think it’s worthwhile to delve a bit further into the intellectual and social context in which these ideas were put forward.

Why bother? Because ideas matter for policy. There are good, hard-nosed reasons for believing that rationales are not mere epiphenomena of political interests. Understanding why and how certain policies are implemented requires some digging into the justifications of policymakers. A bit of intellectual archaeology might also identify some path dependence in economic thinking about development. The point is not to impugn the motives of current policymakers or academic researchers, but to shed light on any hidden intellectual baggage that might be weighing down their efforts. Old dead economists might teach us something valuable after all.

John Ruskin slays a racialized student of the Dismal Science

How do the ideas of economists fit into this historical collision of racism, imperialism, and international politics that gave us the development establishment? Before jumping right into more proximate causes, a bit of pre-history might help set the scene. WWII was not the dismal science's first collision with race and empire. As it turns out, the "dismal" moniker that economists have long enjoyed stems from those very debates.

David Levy and Sandra Peart have extensively chronicled the relationship between classical economics and the racism contemporary to it. The surprise ending? The economists were the good guys. That's right. Vile, contemptible economists--apologists for markets, purveyors of selfishness--were the public defenders of racial equality (along with the "Exeter Hall" evangelical Christians). Then who were the bad guys? The poets: Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, and everyone's favorite literary critic of capitalism, Charles Dickens. It was Carlyle who christened economics as the dismal science, in contrast with the "gay science" of poetry. The context is shocking:

Truly, my philanthropic friends, Exeter Hall philanthropy is wonderful; and the social science -- not a "gay science," but a rueful --which finds the secret of this universe in "supply and demand," and reduces the duty of human governors to that of letting men alone, is also wonderful. Not a "gay science," I should say, like some we have heard of; no, a dreary, desolate and, indeed, quite abject and distressing one; what we might call, by way of eminence, the dismal science. These two, Exeter Hall philanthropy and the Dismal Science, led by any sacred cause of black emancipation, or the like, to fall in love and make a wedding of it -- will give birth to progenies and prodigies: dark extensive moon-calves, unnameable abortions, wide-coiled monstrosities, such as the world has not seen hitherto!

Carlyle is arguing here for the reintroduction of slavery in the West Indian colonies. John Stuart Mill responded, in line with classical economists' assumption of a deep human homogeneity. Differences between societies are the result of the incentives individuals face, meaning that history and institutions are the root cause of different levels of development. By contrast, the Romantic poets argued that inherent differences between individuals justified hierarchical relationships--for the good of the lesser races, of course. They longed for bygone feudalism when better men cared for their inferiors, while the economists argued that equals should come together in mutually beneficial market exchange.

BrightEconomists played this part again in the debate over Irish home rule, arguing that Ireland's economic backwardness was due to bad institutional arrangements, themselves the result of centuries of British invasions. For their part, the economists' opponents depicted them--personified as John Bright--as peddling snake oil to the subhuman Irish.

In both these cases, economists' underlying egalitarianism clashed with paternalism of an ugly sort. The "dismal" label should be worn as a badge of honor for precisely this reason. But why did later dismal scientists sign on so readily to the paternalist project of development? Why were voices like Bauer and Frankel so rare? I don't think the abandonment of racist language is a sufficient cause. Other tectonic shifts in economic thought took place in the intervening decades. Which were decisive? This is an open question worth pursuing further.

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