Educating a Democracy for Deterrence

Remarks delivered to a class at the United States Air Force Academy (views the author’s own). Photo (c) Mark Kennedy

The most effective military strategy the United States has ever pursued—deterrence—is also the one our political system is least equipped to sustain.

When deterrence works, nothing happens.
No crisis.
No headlines.
No urgency.

And in a democracy, what does not happen rarely commands attention, funding, or political reward.

I learned this lesson not in uniform, but serving in Congress—particularly in the aftermath of September 11th. As we examined how the attacks happened, one conclusion cut through layers of intelligence failure and bureaucratic breakdown: a failure of imagination. We did not imagine how evil could emerge, adapt, and circumvent safeguards designed for a different threat environment.

Twenty-five years later, I worry we are repeating the same mistake—not only because we underestimate adversaries’ intent, but because we misunderstand deterrence itself.

Deterrence is quiet. It is preventive. It works best when it never has to prove itself. And that makes it profoundly difficult to sustain inside a political system driven by elections, visibility, and short-term results.

Understanding that reality—and learning how to lead within it—is an essential responsibility for military officers. It is part of your duty beyond the battlefield.

America’s Inward Turn

Before explaining how Congress works, it is important to understand the environment in which it operates.

America has turned inward.

Many voters are increasingly:

• Isolationist
• Protectionist
• Skeptical of alliances

Few understand:

• How trade builds relationships while tariffs breed resentment
• How foreign aid prevents instability
• How unilateral military action can undermine long-term objectives

Global engagement is often seen as cost, not leverage.

This shift in public sentiment matters deeply, because Congress reflects its voters more than it leads them—especially on issues where the consequences are distant and abstract.

China: A Rival We Poorly Understand

This inward turn collides dangerously with a reality many Americans still fail to grasp.

The United States has not faced a rival this close to its peer—economically, militarily, diplomatically, and technologically—since our revolutionary struggle with Great Britain.

Many still believe the challenge is simply preventing China from stealing American technology. They do not recognize that China has evolved to lead in many technological domains.

Deterring a peer competitor requires sustained investment, alliances, imagination, and long-term discipline—none of which come naturally in democratic politics, particularly when the public does not fully understand the stakes.

How Congress Actually Works—and Why It Matters

Every Member of Congress, regardless of party, ideology, or background, operates under one overriding incentive:

To remain elected.

To do that, Members must:

1. Be responsive to constituents—especially the ones they see
2. Be seen as effective
3. Raise money

These are not cynical observations. They are structural facts of democratic governance. And they explain far more about defense outcomes than abstract debates over strategy.

Members of Congress do not primarily respond to classified briefings, strategy documents, or long-term threat assessments. They respond to:

• Constituents who show up
• Civic leaders who call
• Narratives that repeat back home

That means educating a Member of Congress is rarely sufficient. You must also educate their staff, their civic leaders, and—most importantly—their voters.

Because in the end, Members take their cues from home.

Coalition Politics—and Why the Military Struggles to Compete

Members of Congress do not govern for “everyone equally.” They govern for all—but keep a keen focus on their 50 percent plus one coalition.

As they form that coalition, they decide whose voices to prioritize:

• Unions or small business owners
• Teachers or parents
• Aid recipients or taxpaying families

Here lies a fundamental challenge for the military.

The military is—and must remain—nonpartisan. That is a strength. But politically, it creates ambiguity.

Members do not instinctively see “the military” as:

• A decisive voting bloc
• A swing constituency
• A group that determines elections

As a result, military readiness often loses out to groups with clearer electoral identities—even when readiness is essential to national survival.

Visibility Beats Strategy

Many Members of Congress do not have a large active-duty base in their district.
Many do not have a major defense contractor employing thousands of workers.

What they almost always have is the National Guard.

For many Members, the Guard is the only military they regularly see:

• At community events
• During disaster response
• At parades and town halls

That visibility matters enormously.

But it creates a distortion.

Guard advocacy—understandably—often focuses on equity: the age of equipment, the fact that Guard units operate older platforms than the active force. What it rarely highlights is what the active force needs to deter future conflict.

Members hear compelling human stories. They do not always hear strategic ones.

To often, Congress can become deeply invested in preserving legacy systems or platforms tied to local identity and jobs—even when the uniformed military believes divestment is necessary to prepare for emerging threats.

Congress Responds to Voters, Not Briefings

Members of Congress respond to voters.
Voters respond to stories they understand.

That is why educating the public is inseparable from educating Congress.

This does not mean lobbying.
It does not mean politicizing the force.

It means officers engaging communities not only as recruiters, but as educators—explaining global challenges, emerging threats, and why deterrence requires sustained investment long before crisis arrives.

There is an unavoidable tension here. Honest education about the risks we face can make military service appear more dangerous—and at times that may cut against recruiting. But obscuring risk does not make service safer; it makes deterrence weaker. A democracy that understands the dangers its military must deter is more likely to resource that mission properly, reducing the likelihood that those risks ever have to be realized.

A democracy that does not understand deterrence cannot sustain it.

Scale, Fragmentation, and the Reality of Micromanagement

There are 435 Members of the House and 100 Senators.

Every one of them wants to accomplish something tangible.
Very few have the leverage to shape grand strategy.

So they turn to appropriations.

Appropriations allow Members to:

• Deliver visible results
• Protect local interests
• Demonstrate effectiveness
• Serve colleagues

Appropriators are not simply advancing their own priorities. They are carrying dozens—sometimes hundreds—of requests from fellow Members.

That is why micromanagement happens.

It is not malice.
It is math.

Budget Politics Crowd Out Strategy

This reality must be stated plainly.

Budget politics crowd out strategy.

On the left, many Members sincerely believe domestic spending produces more security than defense spending.
On the right, many Members sincerely believe tax cuts and deficit reduction are the highest priorities.

Both views may be held in good faith.

But the result is the same: sustained military modernization becomes what is left after tax debates, domestic priorities, debt ceilings, and short-term crises are addressed.

Very few Members wake up asking how to optimize force structure to deter a peer competitor three to twenty years from now.

Strategy loses to budget math.

The Budget Congress Rarely Passes—and Why CRs Dominate

One of the military’s greatest frustrations is Congress’s repeated failure to pass budgets on time.

This failure is not partisan.

Neither side’s constituency rewards compromise:

• One rewards fighting for less spending
• The other rewards fighting for more

Both reward visible confrontation, not agreement.

The predictable result is repeated continuing resolutions (CRs).

CRs prevent:

• New program starts
• Innovation
• Rapid reprioritization

Exactly what the military needs most during periods of strategic competition.

Some progress has been made in granting limited flexibility during CRs, particularly for new starts and urgent priorities. That progress matters.

It is more likely that Congress will expand flexibility during CRs than that it will suddenly begin passing budgets on time.

Both the failure to pass budgets and the need for flexibility during CRs are bipartisan realities.

Informing the public about the need for flexibility during CRs should not be viewed as partisan. It is a matter of national competence.

Infrastructure, Bases, and the Drag on the Sharp Edge of the Spear

Another underappreciated challenge is infrastructure.

The military maintains roughly 25 percent more bases and facilities than it needs.

Why?

Because no Member of Congress wants to lose a base.

Bases mean:

• Jobs
• Local identity
• Political credit

As a result, infrastructure protection becomes a consuming preoccupation.

Resources that could sharpen the pointy end of the spear are instead spread across facilities that no longer align with deterrence priorities.

Maintaining excess infrastructure is not neutral.
It is a strategic tradeoff.

And it pulls attention, money, and leadership focus away from the capabilities that matter most.

Structural Challenges Unique to the Military

Several additional realities compound these problems.

A Volunteer Force Creates Distance
Less than one percent of Americans serve. For most Members of Congress, military service is abstract—not personal.

Officers Rotate—Congress Does Not
Senior officers rotate every two to three years. Members of Congress may serve for decades. Just as trust forms, relationships reset.

Deterrence Is Invisible—Until It Fails
Success looks like nothing happening. Failure looks like war. Democracies react to crises, not prevention.

Failure of Imagination Remains the Greatest Risk
Adversaries exploit seams, operate below thresholds, and adapt faster than institutions. If leaders cannot imagine future conflict, they will underinvest until it is too late.

Unity Matters More Than You Think

Congress struggles even when the military is unified.

Division within the military becomes an excuse not to act.

When Members hear conflicting messages—from services, Guard associations, or retired leaders—the result is delay and paralysis.

Congress funds what feels safe.
Division signals uncertainty.

Educating a Democracy for Deterrence

So what can be done?

Officers must recognize that educating a democracy for deterrence is part of their professional responsibility.

That means:

• Engaging civic leaders who influence elected officials
• Speaking beyond recruiting—about global challenges and future risk
• Cultivating voices who care about the force needed to deter, not just protect local jobs
• Translating military needs into civilian terms: risk, consequences, time, and tradeoffs

Civilian control of the military is not a weakness. It is a strength—but only when civilians are informed.

Trust is the currency that converts military advice into political action.

Closing

The American system was never designed to make military modernization easy. It was designed to prevent unchecked power.

Your responsibility as officers is not to fight that system—but to lead within it.

Those who understand Congress do not just command forces. They shape the environment in which deterrence succeeds—or fails.

And that responsibility is inseparable from your oath.

In line with my belief that responsibly embracing AI is essential to both personal and national success, this piece was developed with the support of AI tools, though all arguments and conclusions are my own.