The AI Race Will Be Won in the Market

Daniela Muhaj

Mark Kennedy

March 9, 2026

The United States can build the world’s most advanced AI systems and still lose the global market.

Washington has optimized its artificial intelligence (AI) strategy around frontier capabilities: model scale, compute density, and semiconductor controls. Those matter, but address only one side of the equation. The strategic contest is no longer about the most capable model. It is about whose AI stack achieves global deployment.

AI is shifting from frontier research capability to a general-purpose economic input. In that shift, performance leadership becomes necessary but insufficient. Power accrues to the ecosystem most widely adopted, most reliable, and most deeply integrated into commercial and government systems. Diffusion, not just capability, determines long-term strategic advantage.

In many emerging markets, the constraint is not only access to models but the preparedness to deploy them. Infrastructure readiness, financing capacity, and institutional absorption determine whether AI systems move from experimentation to production. Market formation matters as much as model sophistication. Systems that can operate within constrained infrastructure, limited technical capacity, and multi-year investment cycles are more likely to achieve durable adoption.

This is the premise of secure diffusion. At the India AI Impact Summit, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy Michael Kratsios argued countries should be able to access leading American AI systems while retaining sovereignty over their use. Kratsios said: “America is the only AI superpower willing and able to truly empower partner nations in your pursuit of meaningful AI sovereignty. American companies can build large, independent AI infrastructure, with secure and robust supply chains that minimize backdoor risk. They build it; it’s yours.”

The objective of secure diffusion is clear: pair frontier leadership with global adoption under credible security safeguards. The difficulty is structural. Diffusion and security pull in opposite directions. The U.S. approach risks privileging control over scale. Three tensions define the problem.

When Export Controls Erode the Market

Export controls sit at the center of U.S. AI strategy. Restricting advanced chips and certain model capabilities aims to slow adversaries and protect national security.

But controls have a half-life.

When restrictions are broad, opaque, or cumbersome, they do not simply deny access. They change incentives. Competitors accelerate substitution. Second movers replicate core functionality at lower cost. Partners hedge. Sales that finance U.S. research and development disappear. Controls designed to preserve technological advantage can, over time, narrow the commercial base that sustains it.

This dynamic is already visible. The more the U.S. signals that access to advanced AI systems may be constrained, delayed, or politicized, the more countries prioritize alternatives with speed, certainty, and fewer restraints.

The strategic question is how to restrict without shrinking the market. A hardware-centric approach is insufficient.

Governance must shift from component-level control to capability-level calibration. Capability ceilings, licensing tied to compute thresholds, and lifecycle monitoring are more aligned with risk than blunt hardware bans. Security should be embedded in the deployment architecture, not applied episodically at the point of sale.

The U.S. must treat predictability as strategic capital. Infrastructure buyers do not anchor critical systems to suppliers with unstable access rules.

This is particularly consequential in infrastructure-constrained environments. Governments and firms in emerging markets plan digital infrastructure investments over multi-year cycles. If access to advanced AI systems appears politically contingent or subject to abrupt revision, systems become difficult to integrate into national technology strategies. Predictability is not only a commercial advantage but a development requirement.

Where Frontier Advantage Meets the Volume Market

The U.S. leads at the AI capability frontier. Its firms set performance benchmarks. Its research institutions drive algorithmic progress. Preserving that edge is essential.

However, the frontier is not a volume market; from an export perspective, it is a premium, high-cost, low-volume segment.

Most customers do not require the most advanced model, but systems that are affordable, adaptable, and deployable at scale. Models must function in local languages, on constrained infrastructure, and across industry-specific applications.

The U.S. ecosystem pushes performance boundaries. Competitors can optimize for diffusion. They can observe frontier systems, replicate adequate core functionality, and deploy open-weight or lower-cost alternatives at scale.

If alternatives spread widely, they shape developer ecosystems, data standards, and procurement. Once embedded at scale, switching costs rise and path dependence hardens. The U.S. risks a bifurcated outcome; high end dominance but mass market erosion.

The strategic response is deliberate segmentation. Frontier systems remain critical for sensitive and research-intensive applications. But diffusion requires competitive mid-tier offerings aligned with global demand. Secure open-weight models anchored in U.S. governance frameworks can expand reach without ceding influence.

Financing is equally important. In many markets, capital is the key constraint. Providers gain structural advantage by bundling AI systems with financing and implementation support. U.S. export credit and development finance tools must be equipped to support the full range of AI ecosystem deployment, not just traditional infrastructure.

Models alone rarely determine adoption; the surrounding deployment ecosystem does.

Why Adoption Requires Coalition

Sovereignty and industrial alignment are the final tension.

Countries adopting AI systems increasingly seek control over governance, localization, and integration. They also seek economic participation. Domestic firms want a role in deployment, customization, and services.

Here, the integration of national champions becomes strategic.

Rather than exporting a closed system, the U.S. can anchor the most sensitive layers (including advanced compute, core models, and security standards) while integrating trusted partner firms into deployment and application layers. Domestic cloud providers, telecommunications companies, and software integrators can become stakeholders in a U.S.-aligned ecosystem.

This approach reshapes incentives. Alignment benefiting local firms economically   enhances political durability. Integration becomes economic participation, not dependency.

If the U.S. insists on control without integration, others will assemble parallel systems, around either open-weight models or alternative providers offering greater transfer and fewer constraints. Coalition, not exclusivity, sustains influence in infrastructure markets.

As a further complication, many markets already operate in mixed-trust infrastructure environments. Telecommunications networks, subsea cables, and cloud systems often combine providers assessed differently across security frameworks. Strategically, does the U.S. compete within them or cede them? Secure diffusion requires architectures operating in mixed environments while embedding monitoring, verification, and layered security standards.

Translating AI Leadership into Global Scale

The U.S. begins from a position of strength, leading in frontier AI research, advanced semiconductor design, cloud infrastructure, and capital formation. Leadership translates into sustained global scale by aligning policy with structural realities.

Calibrated controls preserve market access. Scalable offerings preserve ecosystem share. Integrated coalitions preserve political durability. Together, they convert technical leadership into sustained market position. Across each area, execution determines outcomes. Secure diffusion requires institutional capacity to implement coherent, scaled policy. Export controls, market access, and technology partnerships must be consistent across agencies and over time. This requires adequately resourced commercial engagement, sustained diplomatic coordination, and technical expertise embedded within economic and development institutions. Firms and partner governments interpret policy not only through legislation but through daily interaction with regulators, export authorities, and development finance institutions. When engagement machinery is fragmented or under-resourced, strategy struggles to translate into deployment.

Diffusion at scale requires financial ecosystems, regulatory institutions, and human capital capable of absorbing the technology. Frontier advantage is the starting point. Scale determines who shapes the system and who benefits from it.

Development Impact: AI’s long-term developmental value depends on balancing frontier capabilities with predictable access to affordable and adaptable systems. By shifting from blunt hardware controls to capability-based calibration and local industrial integration, the U.S. can prevent a “digital divide” where emerging economies are forced to choose between restricted high-end systems and less secure alternatives.

Daniela Muhaj
Daniela Muhaj

Director of Research and Technology Initiatives and Adjunct Faculty, Georgetown University

Mark Kennedy

Director & Senior Fellow