DRI Working Paper No. 40
By Alastair Smith, NYU and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, NYU

Tanzania's Economic and Political Performance: A District-Level Test of Selectorate Theory Hypotheses derived from the selectorate theory of political survival are tested against Tanzanian district-level data. We assess the extent to which resource allocations within Tanzania depend on the size of the district-level presidential winning coalition and the presidential support coalition. Using indicators that precisely measure coalition size given Tanzania’s electoral rules, we find that smaller winning coalition districts emphasize private goods allocations such as maize vouchers and road construction. Larger coalition districts emphasize public goods provision such as better health care access, residential electrification, greater income equality, and a lower infant mortality rate. These findings hold with controls for poverty, productivity, and population. Support coalition size – that is, total vote share for the winning party – generally has an insignificant effect on public and private goods allocations. Likewise, the control variables generally have little effect.